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THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SCHOOL PRAYER: OR
WHY ENGEL V. VITALE MAY HAVE HAD IT RIGHT ALL
ALONG
WILLIAM P. MARSHALL*

Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and we beg Thy blessing upon us, our parents, our
teachers, and our country.'
The School Prayer decisions 2 have now been with us for a long time.
Engel v. Vitale, the case that invalidated the recital of the so-called
Regents' prayer in the public schools, was decided in 1962.' Abington
School District v. Schempp, the decision striking down Bible reading and
the recitation of the Lord's Prayer, was issued in 1963.4
Nevertheless, the question of the propriety of state-sponsored prayer
has not gone away. Recent polling suggests that 61% of Americans still
support some form of school prayer.' Legislative prayer continues to be a
contentious issue throughout the country 6 even though the Court in Marsh
v. Chambers,' and more recently in Town of Greece v. Galloway,8 held that
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I This is the full text of the prayer that was at issue in Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 422
(1962).
2 The term "School Prayer decisions," as used in this Article, refers to Engel v. Vitale,

370 U.S. 421 (1962), and Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), not to the
later Supreme Court cases that also addressed school prayer issues.
3 Engel, 370 U.S. at 421.
4 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 203.
1Rebecca Riffkin, In U.S., Supportfor Daily Prayer in Schools Dips Slightly, GALLUP

(Sept. 25, 2014), http://www.gallup.com/poll/1 77401/support-daily-prayer-schools-dipsslightly.aspx [https://perma.cc/M23S-4SQR].
6
E.g., Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 271-72 (4th Cir. 2017).
7463 U.S. 783 (1983).
8 134 S. Ct 1811 (2014).
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at least some forms of the practice are constitutionally permissible. 9
Political and opinion leaders continue to effectively use the ban on school
prayer to galvanize political opposition to the Supreme Court and to what
is perceived as an overly secularized society.'o The religious right, a
movement that owes its existence, at least in part, to the public reaction
against school prayer decisions, remains a potent political force." Publicschool prayer, my students tell me, continues to be routinely practiced in
some areas of the country.12
The controversy surrounding the School Prayer decisions has not
subsided.13 Nor is it likely to. The intersection of state and religion is
' The Galloway Court did not hold that all forms of legislative prayer were permissible.
Rather, the Court indicated that prayers that "denigrate nonbelievers ... threaten
damnation, or preach conversion" could potentially violate the anti-establishment mandate.
Id. at 1823.
The volatility of legislative prayer after Galloway was evident in a recent decision by
the Fourth Circuit in Lund. In that case, the Fourth Circuit, in a deeply divided en banc
decision, struck down the County's practice of opening its sessions with a legislative prayer
that (1) was led by elected officials, (2) who invited the attendees to the public meeting to
pray with the government officials, and (3) was uniformly sectarian. Lund, 863 F.3d at 272.
'0 See Robert Costa, Conservatives Seek to Regain Control of Republican Agenda,
WASH. POST (May 15, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/conservatives-seekto-regain-control-of-republican-agenda/2014/05/15/aaa2Oc8O-dc6e- lle3-bdal9b46b2066796_story.html [https://perma.cc/8SCN-TZEW]; ROBERT NORTH ROBERTS ET
AL., PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGNS, SLOGANS, ISSUES, AND PLATFORMs 422-23 (2012); Matthew
Brown, 50 Years Later: High Court's School Prayer Ruling Still Fuels Religious Liberty
Debate, DESERET NEWS (June 24, 2012, 7:00 PM), http://www.deseretnews.com/article/
865558046/50-years-later-High-courts-school-prayer-ruling-still-fuels-reigious-libertydebate.html?pg=all [https://perma.cc/C4MY-U6JZ]; Emma Margolin, 50 Years After
SCOTUS Banned School Prayer, Debate Lives On, MSNBC (Sept. 13, 2013, 8:47 AM),
http://www.msnbc.com/thomas-roberts/50-years-after-scotus-banned-school-prayer-d
[https://perma.cc/L3LH-4JNH]; Tierney Sneed, School Prayer Fight Begins Anew, U.S.
NEWS (Aug. 27, 2014, 1:27 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/articles/2014/08/27/schoolprayer-fight-begins-anew [https://perma.cc/5LBC-MXCV].
" See John C. Jeffries, Jr. & James E. Ryan, A Political History of the Establishment
Clause, 100 MICH. L. REv. 279, 320-21 (2001).
12
See Corrina Barrett Lain, God, Civic Virtue, and the American Way: Reconstructing
Engel, 67 STAN. L. REv. 479, 552 (2015) ("Even today, school prayer remains a feature of
some Southern schools.").
13 See supra note 10.
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always a volatile mix, and that volatility only increases when the public
schools and our children's upbringing are at stake.14
What may be more surprising is that after over fifty years the law
underlying the School Prayer decisions is also unsettled. By this, I do not
mean simply that a new set of Justices could overturn the decisions.
Rather, what I mean is that later cases addressing school prayer have not
relied on the justifications offered by Engel and Schempp as to why school
prayer is unconstitutional.s Although the later cases are consistent in
result with Engel and Schempp, in that they invalidate the prayer exercise
at issue, those cases nonetheless appear to rest on rationales that are
different than those offered in the original decisions. Specifically, while
Engel and Schempp focus on societal harms caused by school prayer, such
as sectarian divisiveness and the corruption of religion, the later cases
primarily concentrate on individual harms such as coercion and
alienation.1 6 This doctrinal inconsistency, then, might suggest that the
constitutional case against school prayer is not as straightforward as one

might think.
This Article reexamines the constitutional foundations of the School
Prayer decisions.
Part I briefly canvasses the Engel and Schempp
decisions, along with the three other school prayer cases that followed
them, in order to determine their doctrinal impact. This Part demonstrates
that Engel and Schempp have had surprisingly little effect on
Establishment Clause doctrine even though the Court has continued to
adhere to the decisions' conclusion that school prayer is impermissible.
Part H attempts the hard work-asking whether, and if so why, the School
Prayer decisions are constitutionally correct. This Part concludes that the
Court was right in ruling that school prayer is unconstitutional but that the

14 The debate over the course of public education holds enormously high stakes.

As
Justice Felix Frankfurter once wrote, "The public school is at once the symbol of our
democracy and the most pervasive means for promoting our common destiny." Illinois ex
rel. McCollum v. Bd. of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 231 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See
also Ronald R. Garet, Communality and Existence: The Rights of Groups, 56 S. CAL L.
REV. 1001, 1033 (1983) (public school laws embody society's "moral vision, a dream that
society dreams of itself.").
15 The later cases are Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985); Lee v. Weisman, 505
U.S. 577, 599 (1992); and Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 313 (2000). See
also Engle, 370 U.S. at 421; Schempp, 374 U.S. at 203.
16 See infra notes 95-119 and accompanying text.
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sectarian divisiveness rationale offered in Engel," rather than the
individual harm justifications presented in the later cases, offers the more
persuasive rationale. Part E then notes some of the ironies inherent in
justifying Engel and Schempp on anti-divisiveness grounds.
One caveat before proceeding: the assertion that the unconstitutionality
of school prayer rests on anti-divisiveness grounds might hold significance
for other Establishment Clause issues. For example, because the antidivisiveness rationale does not trigger individualized harm, it has clear
implications for the question of who should have standing to bring
challenges under the Establishment Clause." Similarly, and even more
obviously, the anti-divisiveness rationale should also have strong
repercussions for the constitutionality of government-sponsored prayer
outside the public-school context." This Article, however, focuses
exclusively on the role of anti-divisiveness in the context of the
constitutionality of school prayer and reserves those other questions for
another day.
I.

THE JURISPRUDENCE OF SCHOOL PRAYER

A. Engel and Schempp
It is no exaggeration to claim that the Court's Engel and Schempp
decisions were, and continue to be, the most controversial cases in the
entirety of religion clause jurisprudence.20 It is also no exaggeration to
As will be discussed below, Engel did most of the work in setting forth the reasons
why school prayer was unconstitutional. Schempp merely relied on Engel's rationale. See
infra notes 56-61 and accompanying text.
is See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105-06 (1968) (granting taxpayers standing to
challenge a federal program on Establishment Clause grounds).
19 See Lund v. Rowan Cty., 863 F.3d 268, 286 (4th Cir. 2017) (noting but not relying
upon divisiveness, in striking down a County Board of Commissioners' practice of opening
its meetings with sectarian prayers led by one of its members); Town of Greece v.
Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828 (upholding the practice of opening town board meetings
with a prayer led by local clergy); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (upholding the
opening of legislative sessions with a prayer led by a paid chaplain).
20 Even without limiting the category to religion clause cases, Engel in particular, as
Thomas Berg accurately notes, stands as one of the most controversial Court decisions in
history. Thomas C. Berg, The Story of the School PrayerDecisions: Civil Religion Under
Assault, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES 193, 193 (Richard W. Garnett & Andrew
Koppelman eds., 2012); BRUCE J. DIERENFIELD, THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL PRAYER: How
(continued)
17
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suggest that the prohibition against school prayer that resulted from those
cases defines the popular understanding of what the Establishment Clause
means. 2 1 When one thinks of what the Establishment Clause means, the
prohibition against school prayer comes immediately to the fore. 22
Yet, from a doctrinal perspective, neither Engel nor Schempp are
generally considered to be landmark decisions.23 Rather, the foundational
cases in the Court's Establishment Clause jurisprudence have stemmed
from areas outside the public-school classroom. Everson v. Board of
Education, a parochial aid case,24 is probably the most notable in that
respect, both because it incorporated the Establishment Clause to the
states2 and because it introduced the metaphor of the wall of separation
between church and state into Establishment Clause jurisprudence.2 6
Lemon v. Kurtzman, another parochial aid decision, ranks highly because it
created the famous (infamous?) three-prong test that guided Establishment
Clause jurisprudence for over a quarter of a century.2 7 Justice O'Connor's
72 (2007). See also STEVEN K. GREEN, THE BIBLE, THE
SCHOOL, AND THE CONSTITUTION 3 (2012) ("The public outcry over the Schempp and
Murray decisions was even louder than the one over Engel.").
For a thoughtful and insightful account that the Engel Court itself did not realize its
decision would be so controversial, see Lain, supra note 12, at 484, 499-506.
2' GREEN, supra note 20, at 3-4.
22
Id. at 4.
23 That Engel, in particular, broke no new ground was recognized contemporaneously
ENGEL V. VIIALE CHANGED AMERICA

by at least one of the leading constitutional law academics of that period. See Philip B.
Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying... ", 1962 SUP.
CT. REV. 1, 32. (1962).
24 The issue was whether the state could provide bus transportation to children attending
parochial schools. Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1947).
25 Id. at 15 ("Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a church. Neither
can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one religion over another.
Neither can force nor influence a person to go to or to remain away from church against his
will or force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion.").
26 Id. at 16. The decision is also famous for its proclamation that the Establishment
Clause means that "[n]o tax in any amount, large or small, can be levied to support any
religious activities or institutions, whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may
adopt to teach or practice religion." Id.
27 The three-part Lemon test requires that (1) the government action must have a secular
legislative purpose; (2) its principal or primary effect must be one that neither advances nor
inhibits religion, and (3) it must not foster "an excessive government entanglement with
(continued)
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concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, addressing the constitutionality of a
state's display of religious symbols, merits prominence because of its
announcement of the "non-endorsement" test28 that now occupies much of
Establishment Clause doctrine. 29 Mueller v. Allen, the tuition deduction
case, and Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, the tuition voucher case, are
significant because they set forth the rule that aid to religious organizations
will likely be upheld as long as the program in question does not favor
religion and is available to a broad class of beneficiaries that includes
religious and nonreligious entities.30 In fact, the only school prayer case
that can submit any claim to doctrinal importance is Lee v. Weisman and its
inclusion of a coercion element into the Establishment Clause inquiry."
Yet, as will be discussed below, the jurisprudential impact of Weisman has
yet to become clear.32
Engel and Schempp, in contrast, do not have strong doctrinal
legacies."
Both cases are often cited for the proposition that the
government must act with a secular purpose,34 and Schempp (although not
religion." 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). The test's preservation in light of constant attack
has been notable. Justice Scalia once described the test as being like "some ghoul in a latenight horror movie that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being
repeatedly killed and buried." Lamb's Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508
U.S. 384, 398 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring).
28 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J. concurring) ("Every government practice
must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes an
endorsement or disapproval of religion").
29 See McCreary Cty. v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005); Van Orden
v. Perry,
545 U.S. 677, 698-700 (2005).
3 Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 397 (1983); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S.
639, 652 (2002). See also Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 794 (2000).
3 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992).
32
Notably, the plaintiffs in Galloway relied primarily on the anti-coercion rationale,
rather than on Lemon or non-endorsement, in arguing that the legislative prayer at issue in
that case was unconstitutional-perhaps suggesting that the coercion test is achieving
greater prominence in Establishment Clause litigation. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134
S. Ct. 1811, 1825-26 (2014). Nevertheless, they did not prevail. Id. at 1828.
13 The cases did not, for example, impact the Court's decisions on the constitutionality
of legislative prayer. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 791-92 (upholding legislative
prayer); Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1828.
34 See, e.g., Weisman, 505 U.S. at 584-85 ("[T]o satisfy the Establishment Clause a
governmental practice must .. . reflect a clearly secular purpose .... .").
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Engel) was, in fact, the first case to articulate that requirement.3 ' Neither
case, however, is regularly cited as authority for setting forth the
constitutional justifications underlying the anti-establishment provision. 36
Engel v. Vitale, as mentioned, was the decision that struck down the
voluntary recital of the state-composed, so-called Regents' Prayer in the
New York public schools. 37
In so holding, the Court discussed two
separate justifications.
The first involved a concern of religious
divisiveness ("anti-divisiveness").38 According to the Engel Court, the
3 The attribution of secular purpose to Engel is actually anachronistic because the
secular purpose requirement was not announced until Schempp, which was decided one
year after Engel. Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963).
Schempp also introduced the second prong in what was to later become Lemon v.
Kurtzman's three-prong Establishment Clause test: the requirement that an enactment must
not have the primary effect of advancing or inhibiting religion. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
As will be discussed below, however, the majority opinion in Schempp did not explain why
the Establishment Clause demanded the secular-purpose and primary-effect inquires, nor
did it set forth how school prayer violated those specific tests. See infra notes 56-57 and
accompanying text.
36 The lack of Engel's impact in setting forth the justifications for the Establishment
Clause is perhaps most apparent in the Court's development of the non-endorsement test.
As set forth in Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly, the nonendorsement test requires that government not take action that "constitutes an endorsement
or disapproval of religion." 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
One might think that non-endorsement and anti-divisiveness would have been seen by
the Court as directly related. After all, a test that prohibits the government from endorsing
religion, id., would presumably discourage religion from seeking that endorsement. It
would therefore eliminate the divisiveness that comes from religions competing for "the
Government's stamp of approval," Engel, 370 U.S. at 429, because religions would no
longer compete for that approval. Nevertheless, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Lynch did
not even cite the Engel decision, and the Court has never explicitly recognized the
relationship between non-endorsement and divisiveness. Rather, to Justice O'Connor, the
harm from government endorsement is individual alienation and not the societal disruption
caused by sectarian division. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688.
n The prayer in Engel was "Almighty God, we acknowledge our dependence upon
Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, our teachers and our Country."
Engel, 370 U.S. at 422. For an excellent account of the factual background of the Engel
litigation, see Berg, supra note 20, at 227.
38 The anti-divisiveness rationale is extensively discussed in Richard W. Garnett,
Religion, Division, and the FirstAmendment, 94 GEO. L.J. 1667 (2006).
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Framers were concerned with "the anguish, hardship and bitter strife that
could come when zealous religious groups struggled with one another to
obtain the Government's stamp of approval." 39 The "content of [the]
prayers and [the] privilege of praying," the Court stated, was therefore not
intended by the Framers to "be influenced by the ballot box." 40 Notably,
the divisiveness harm recognized in Engel does not accrue to the
individual." Rather, the injury is one that affects society generally and not
specific persons.4 2
The second rationale offered in Engel was the concern with corruption
of religion ("anti-corruption").
Specifically, the Engel Court ruled that
the Regents' Prayer was problematic because it violated the principle that
religion is inevitably corrupted when it depends upon government for its
support.44 As the Court stated, "The Establishment Clause thus stands as
an expression of principle on the part of the Founders of our Constitution
that religion is too personal, too sacred, too holy, to permit its 'unhallowed
perversion' by a civil magistrate."' Having the state first write, and then
promote, a matter as religious as prayer would then be a cardinal violation
of this principle.4 6
As with anti-divisiveness, the anti-corruption rationale is not based
upon protecting against individual injury.47 The concern is with the effects
of the challenged action on the integrity of religion and not with its effects
on particular persons.4 8
Abington School District v. Schempp, in turn, addressed the
constitutionality of the recitation of the Lord's Prayer and the practice of

39

Engel, 370 U.S. at 429. The Engel Court also expressed concern for the subsequent

harm to the religious minorities who might not be able to prevail in the political debate. Id.
at 431.
40
Id. at 429.
41 Id. at 430.
42

Id. at 431.

Id. at 431-32. For a detailed discussion of this rationale, see Andrew Koppelman,
Corruption of Religion and the Establishment Clause, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1831
(2009).
44 Engel, 370 U.S. at 431-32.
45 Id.
" Id. at 425.
47 Koppelman, supra note 43, at 1841.
43

49Id.
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Bible reading in the public schools.4 9 Like Engel, Schempp had an
enormous practical impact, effectively invalidating the practices of
thousands of school districts throughout the country.o It was also, in many
respects, even more disruptive than Engel in that it struck down practices
that had been in place in the public schools since the beginning of the
nineteenth century."
Like Engel, Schempp also has not had much influence in Establishment
Clause jurisprudence.52 To be sure, as noted previously, Schempp was the
first case that set forth the proposition that in order to avoid Establishment
Clause scrutiny, a government action must have a valid secular purpose.53
Schempp also introduced what was to become the second prong of the
Lemon test, i.e., that the challenged action must have "a primary effect that
neither advances nor inhibits religion."54 But Justice Clark's majority
opinion in Schempp did not set forth the constitutional rationales
underlying the secular purpose and primary effect test and, in effect, added
little in substance to what Engel had already set out5 5 Moreover, even
after announcing the secular-purpose and primary-effect tests, the Schempp
Court never adequately explained why Bible reading or the recitation of
the Lord's Prayer violated those requirements. Rather, the Court simply
held that the exercises were religious and were "intended by the State to be
so."

56

49 374 U.S. at 205-06.
For an insightful background discussion of the Schempp
litigation, see Douglas Laycock, Edward Schempp and His Family, 38 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 63
(2013).
" See sources cited supra note 10. As Thomas Berg notes, however, Schempp actually
precipitated less controversy than Engel. Berg, supra note 20, at 221.
" See GREEN, supra note 20, at 13.
52 Ernest J. Brown, Quis Custodiet Ipsos Custodes?-The School-Prayer Cases, 1963 S.
CT. REV. 1, 5 ("Justice Clark's opinion for the Court [in Schempp] added very little to what
was said in Engel.").
1 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222.
54 Id
1 See Stephen D. Smith, ConstitutionalDivide: The Transformative Significance of the
School PrayerDecisions, 38 PEPP. L. REV. 945, 959 (2011) ("Clark's somewhat mechanical
majority opinion offered little analysis .... ); Brown, supra note 52, at 5.
s 6 Schempp, 374 U.S. at 223 (concluding that the recitation of the Lord's Prayer and the
reading of Bible verses at the start of each school day are "religious ceremony[ies] and
w[ere] intended by the State to be so").
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The mere conclusion that the prayers were religious, however, does not
answer the questions posed by the secular-purpose inquiry. Even if the
exercises were religious, the state might have had a secular purpose in
supporting them, such as sending a message that the state was not hostile to
religion or providing a moment of solemnity at the beginning of the school
day. Alternatively, the state could argue that the prayers served the secular
purposes of providing some religious counterweight to the public school's
predominately secular culture and/or familiarizing students with the Bible
for its literary value. Yet, while the Schempp Court noted these arguments,
its only answer to these points was to repeat its previous assertion that the
exercises were religious.5 7
The assertion that the exercises were religious also does not answer the
primary-effect question. Presumably, the Court would need some analysis
or discussion of effects to reach its conclusion that school prayer had the
primary effect of advancing religion.
The Schempp Court, however,
offered no word as to how Bible readings and/or the recitation of the
Lord's Prayer actually advanced religion (and, to be fair, it is not even
clear from the opinion that the Court relied upon the primary-effect test in
reaching its decision)."
More importantly, Schempp did not provide any independent
explanation as to why the Establishment Clause requires a secular purpose
or a primary effect that does not advance or inhibit religion.59 Rather, for
any actual justifications as to why school prayer was impermissible, the
Court appeared to rely entirely on Engel"o (although because the religious
exercise at issue in Schempp was not state-authored like the prayer in
Engel, the anti-corruption justification was less on point).61 One is then
left with Engel's anti-divisiveness rationale as the primary justification
guiding the original School Prayer decisions.
There is, of course, considerable force to the anti-divisiveness (and
anti-corruption) rationales, and much of the remainder of this Article will
be devoted to defending the former. Yet, in assessing the precedential
57
58

Id. at 225.
Id.

s1 Id. For an in-depth analysis of the secular purpose requirement, see generally Andrew
Koppelman, Secular Purpose, 88 VA. L. REV. 87 (2002).
60
Schempp, 374 U.S. at 216.
61 See Brown, supra note 52, at 5 (noting the fact that the prayer in Engel was state-

composed was not considered critical by the Justices in Schempp for construing the earlier

decision).
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impact of Engel and Schempp, it is worth noting that the anti-divisiveness
(and anti-corruption) rationales have not become a part of the general
Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
That is, although the Court has
occasionally nodded in their directions, it has never held that either the
anti-divisiveness 6 2 or anti-corruption6 3 justifications have been sufficient in
and of themselves to invalidate state action under the Establishment
Clause.
This is true, moreover, even with respect to the later Supreme Court
decisions addressing school prayer. In only one of the Court's three
subsequent decisions addressing school prayer, for example, was the antidivisiveness rationale mentioned, and even in that case, it was not the basis
for the Court's ruling. 64 Meanwhile, the anti-corruption rationale has
played no role in these cases at all. Instead, as will be subsequently

Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 689 (O'Connor, J., concurring) ("Although several
of our cases have discussed political divisiveness under the entanglement prong of Lemon,
62

we have never relied on divisiveness as an independent ground for holding a government
practice unconstitutional.") (citations omitted). See also Garnett, supra note 38, at 1669-70
(stating that the

anti-divisiveness

rationale

has not

been

outcome-determinative);

Koppelman, supra note 43, at 1838 (same).
The most notable opinion since Engel suggesting that anti-divisiveness was a central
Establishment Clause concern was Justice Breyer's concurrence in Van Orden v. Perry, 545

U.S. 677, 698-99 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring). In that case, the Court was faced with an
Establishment Clause challenge to a stone monument of the Ten Commandments that had
been on display on the grounds of the Texas State Capitol building for over forty years. In
concluding that the display of the monument survived Establishment Clause scrutiny,
Breyer argued that removal of the monument might prove to be more divisive than allowing
it to remain on the statehouse grounds. Id.
Interestingly, the Court in Galloway pointed to the anti-divisiveness rationale as a
reason for upholding the legislative prayer at issue in that case. Citing Justice Breyer's Van
Orden opinion, the Court stated that "[a] test that would sweep away what has so long been
settled would create new controversy and begin anew the very divisions along religious

lines that the Establishment Clause seeks to prevent." Galloway, 134 S. Ct. at 1819.
63 The anti-corruption rationale has been raised in some dissents, e.g., Zelman v.

Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 711 (Souter, J., dissenting), and has been championed by
Andrew Koppelman, supra note 43, at 1842.

' See infra notes 108-118 and accompanying text (discussing Santa Fe Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290).
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discussed, the Court based the later school prayer decisions on different
justifications altogether.65
One is then left with the conclusion that, as momentous as the School
Prayer decisions may have been, their actual effects on the nuts and bolts
of Establishment Clause doctrine has been relatively minimal. In current
Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the significance of Engel and
Schempp stand mostly in their result-the conclusion that school prayer is
unconstitutional.66
This is, of course, not to deny that there are major jurisprudential
themes that can be gleaned from the School Prayer decisions. In The Story
of the School PrayerDecisions: Civil Religion Under Assault, for example,
Professor Thomas C. Berg discusses the effects the cases had on
government attempts to sustain a so-called civil religion, meaning a
general state-sponsored affirmation of the value of religion and the place of
God in American society. 67 As Berg's title suggests, Engel and Schempp
can be understood as providing the framework for civil religion's later
demise. 68 And, in fact, as Berg points out, Justice Kennedy subsequently
relied on Engel when he wrote in Lee v. Weisman that "[t]he suggestion
that government may establish an official or civic religion as a means of
avoiding the establishment of a religion with more specific creeds strikes
us as a contradiction that cannot be accepted." 69
Dean Rodney K. Smith, in turn, suggests that the decisions were
important steps in resolving the debate surrounding the First Amendment's
original meaning. Specifically, in Public Prayer and the Constitution,
Smith argues that the School Prayer decisions were significant junctures in
the long-standing examination into whether the clauses should be
understood to reflect the position of Justice Story that "the First
Amendment was designed to recognize nondenominational and tolerant
Christianity as our national religion"o or whether it should instead be
See infra notes 85-101 and accompanying text.
66 But see infra notes 66-82 and accompanying text (discussing the views of leading
commentators that the cases were jurisprudentially significant even if they had relatively
little impact on doctrine).
67 Berg, supra note 20, at 226-27.
68 Id. The Court's decision in Galloway, upholding legislative
prayer might suggest,
however, that writing the epitaph for civil religion may have been premature. Galloway,
134 S. Ct. at 1829.
69 Berg, supra note 20, at 227 (quoting Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 590 (1992)).
70
RODNEY K. SMITH, PUBLIC PRAYER AND THE CONSTITUTION 181 (1987).
65
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understood as consonant with James Madison's view that the First
Amendment could permit "state accommodation or perhaps even
facilitation of religious exercise in the public sector, so long as the state
acted in a non-preferential manner and provided that, in so doing, it
refrained from adopting any mode of worship or doctrine as its own." 7 1 As
Dean Smith explains, the School Prayer decisions can be understood as
rejecting Justice Story's reading of the Establishment Clause because the
prayers at issue in those cases would have been permissible under a theory,
such as Story's, that allowed for state-sponsored nondenominational
affirmations of Christianity.7 2 At the same time, as Smith notes, although
the cases did not formally adopt the Madisonian approach," they could be
seen as significant victories for that position because the holding that
school prayer was unconstitutional would be consistent with the
Madisonian vision.74
Professor Steven Smith's account of the school prayer decisions is the
In Constitutional Divide: The Transformative
most far-reaching.
Significance of the School Prayer Decisions, Professor Smith argues that
the School Prayer decisions, and most specifically Schempp, transformed
"not only the jurisprudence of religious freedom but constitutional
discourse generally, and indeed the American self-understanding."' This
was so, according to Professor Smith, because the decisions marked a
turning point in a long-standing, ongoing competition between two
different conceptions on how America was constituted.7 6 The first of these
two conceptions, termed by Smith as "ecumenical providentialism" refers
to the following position:
Id. at 183-84.
Id. at 188-89. Smith is careful to note, however, that although Bible reading would
likely be upheld under Justice Story's approach, that result would not be inevitable.
According to Smith, proponents of Story's position might be concerned with the coercive
aspects of state-led Bible reading and with the fact that the government would necessarily
have to choose which version of the Bible to use in the public school. That divergent
religions have their own versions of the Bible might mean that Bible reading might not be
as easily "susceptible to nondenominational use in a . .. Judeo-Christian sense," as Justice
71

72

Story's position would require. Id. at 183.
73 As Smith points out, Justice Black's opinion in Engel set forth a more separationist

approach than Madison would have advocated. Id. at 174.
74

Id. at 189.

75 Smith, supra note 55, at 947.
76

Id at 949.
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America's history and institutions are subject to an
overarching providence, that public morality or civil virtue
need a religious foundation, and that it is imperative for
citizens and for the nation itself to acknowledge their
dependency upon Providence [although] government can
and should remain noncommittal with respect to specific
creedal differences .... 77
The second, in contrast, termed "political secularism," stands for the
proposition that "religion is and should be a private affair." 78 Professor
Smith contends that the constitutional understanding should be agnostic
between these two visions 7 9 and that the constitutional understanding, in
fact, had been agnostic on this subject throughout most of the Nation's
history." He then argues, however, that the School Prayer decisions
abandoned this agnosticism, replacing it with an era of political secularist
orthodoxy that has since influenced other areas of constitutional law such
as abortion and gay rights.8 i The result of this, Smith argues, is that those
Americans who continue to adhere to the providentialist vision have
become disaffected and resentful.82 In Professor Smith's words, those
subscribing to providentialist conception have "often come to view
themselves as strangers in their own land.""
There is, without doubt, significant merit in the insights of Professor
Berg, Dean Smith, and Professor Smith into the broader meanings of the
School Prayer decisions.
Nevertheless, despite the merits of their
accounts, it remains true that Engel and Schempp have not resonated in the
development of actual Establishment Clause doctrine." Moreover, if, as
previously explained, the key justification for those decisions (antidivisiveness) has not been relied upon in later cases, then there exists a
significant question as to whether the doctrinal bases of the School Prayer
decisions, and by implication their holdings, continue to be valid at all. It
is therefore necessary to examine the alternative rationales for the
77
78

Id at 969-70 (citation omitted).
Id. at 970.

Id. at 988.
Id at 976.
81 Id. at 1009.
79

80

82
83

Id. at 1019.
Id.

84 See supra notes 33-55 and accompanying text.
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invalidation of school prayer that have been advanced in the later school
prayer cases and then to revisit the anti-divisiveness rationale itself.
B. The Later School PrayerCases
Engel and Schempp were not the Court's last words on the school
prayer issue. In 1984, the Court struck down an Alabama moment-ofsilence provision in Wallace v. Jaffree.8 1 In 1992, the Court held in Lee v.
Weisman that a prayer at the beginning of a middle-school graduation
ceremony was unconstitutional.86 In 2000, the Court ruled in Santa Fe
Independent School Districtv. Doe that a student-led prayer prior to highschool football games violated the Establishment Clause.87
The question is what, if anything, did the reasoning in these cases add
to or alter the understanding of the invalidity of school prayer offered in
Engel and Schempp? With respect to Wallace v. Jaffree, the answer is
clearly not much. Wallace involved a challenge to Alabama's moment of
silence provision." Most of the Court's analysis in the case involved its
tracing the history of the law to an effort by the Alabama legislature to
reintroduce prayer into the public school.89 Based upon this history, the
Wallace Court held that the moment-of-silence provision was
unconstitutional as having an improper sectarian purpose. 90
Notably, Wallace did not conclude that any moment of silence would
be improper, 91 only that Alabama's was improper because of its particular
history. 92 The fact that the Court singled out the purpose prong as its basis
472 U.S. 38, 61 (1985).
505 U.S. 577, 599 (1992).
8 530 U.S. 290, 315 (2000).
18 472 U.S. at 40.
89 Id. at 59 (suggesting that "the statute was enacted to convey a message of state
endorsement and promotion of prayer").
90 Id. at 60 (holding that the Alabama legislature created the moment of silence for the
"sole purpose of expressing the State's endorsement of prayer activities for one minute at
the beginning of each schoolday").
9' In fact, as Justice White noted in his dissent, a majority of the Justices in the case
opined that a moment of silence would be constitutionally permissible. Id. at 91 (White, J.,
dissenting) ("[A] majority of the Court would approve statutes that provided for a moment
of silence but did not mention prayer.").
92 Id. at 59 ("The legislative intent to return prayer to the public schools is, of course,
quite different from merely protecting every student's right to engage in voluntary prayer
during an appropriate moment of silence during the schoolday.").
85

86
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for decision gave it an ideal opportunity to expand upon the meaning and
theoretical foundations of the secular purpose requirement. It chose not to
do so.93
Lee v. Weisman, the case addressing the constitutionality of a statesponsored prayer by a member of the clergy at a middle-school graduation
ceremony, in contrast, was a serious attempt by the Court to grapple with
Establishment Clause theory. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court,
purported to formally introduce a new element into the Court's
Establishment Clause jurisprudence-that of coercion.94 To be sure, the
introduction of coercion into the Establishment Clause inquiry was not
completely novel. There was, for example, a reference to the constitutional
problems raised by government coercion of religious belief raised in Engel:
"When the power, prestige and financial support of government is placed
behind a particular religious belief, the indirect coercive pressure upon
religious minorities to conform to prevailing officially approved religion is
plain."9 5 But Engel also made clear that there was no coercion component
in its Establishment Clause analysis. As the Engel Court stated, "The
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not depend
upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and is violated by
the enactment of laws which establish an official religion whether those
laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving individuals or not." 96
Justice Kennedy, however, inserted the coercion element into the
Establishment Clause inquiry and in that sense appeared to contradict the
decisions in Engel and Schempp.9 7 He then went on, however, consistent
93 Id. Justice O'Connor, however, did use her concurrence in Wallace to expand upon
the meaning and application of the endorsement test that she had set forth in Lynch. Id. at
69 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
94 Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 587 (1992) ("It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum,
the Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to support or
participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a way which 'establishes a [state]
religion or religious faith."') (alteration in original) (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 678 (1984)).
95 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962).
9
6 Id. at 430. See also Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963)
("Hence it is necessary in a free exercise case for one to show the coercive effect of the
enactment as it operates against him in the practice of his religion. The distinction between
the two clauses is apparent-a violation of the Free Exercise Clause is predicated on
coercion while the Establishment Clause violation need not be so attended.").
97 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 587.
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in result with Engel and Schempp, to find that the prayer was invalid.98 As
Kennedy explained, because the prayer placed psychological pressure upon
students to "stand as a group or, at least, maintain respectful silence"
during the religious invocation, it was unconstitutional.9 9 To Kennedy, the
state-sponsored prayer created an atmosphere in which objecting students
might feel obligated to hide their opposition in order to avoid jeopardizing
relationships with their peers.ioo This violated the Establishment Clause
because "the government may no more use social pressure to enforce
orthodoxy than it may use more direct means."'
If Weisman was an effort to permanently insert coercion as a necessary
prerequisite to finding an Establishment Clause violation, it has not proved
successful, at least to this point.102 This may be because, as Engel
explained, requiring coercion would be duplicative of the Free Exercise
Clause. 0 ' Or it may be because, as Justice Scalia argued in his Weisman
dissent, a finding that coercion could be established by mere peer pressure,
would mean the test was "boundless, and boundlessly manipulable" 04
(Justice Scalia argued instead that coercion should be found only when the
government support of religion was demanded "by force of law and threat
of penalty"). 0 s In any event, although the Court since Weisman has
continued to use the coercion test in evaluating Establishment Clause

98

Id., at 596.

9 Id at 593.
100 Id.
101 Id at 594.

102 Berg, supra note 20, at 227 ("The attempt to limit the Establishment Clause to cases
of coercion ... ultimately failed.").
103 Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 430 (1962).
See also Ira C. Lupu and Robert W.
Tuttle, Ball on a Needle: Hein v. Freedom from Religion Foundation, Inc. and the Future of
Establishment Clause Adjudication, 2008 BYU L. REV. 115, 135 ("State coercion of
religious experience would seem to be a prima facie violation of the Free Exercise
Clause.") (citation omitted); Steven G. Gey, Religious Coercion and the Establishment
Clause, 1994 U. ILL. L. REV. 463, 490 n.114 (1994).
104 Weisman, 505 U.S. at 632 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
sId at 640. See also Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 49 (2004)
(Thomas, J., concurring).
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challenges, 10 6 it has found Establishment Clause violations without finding
coercion. 0 7

The final school prayer case, Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe, took a different tack.' At issue in Santa Fe was the constitutionality
of a student recital of a prayer prior to football games. 10 9 The relatively
complex election process that the school district put in place leading up to
the student-led prayerio steered the Court into spending significant time
discussing whether the prayer in question should be construed as schoolsponsored prayer and therefore constitutionally problematic, or private
student speech and therefore permissible."'1 Concluding that the practice
was state-sponsored prayer, the Court struck it down by primarily relying
on the non-endorsement Establishment Clause test advanced in the
government-displays-of-religious-symbols cases.112 That test, as originally
explained by Justice O'Connor in her opinion in Lynch v. Donnelly,"'
rested upon a theory of citizen alienation-specifically, O'Connor was
concerned with protecting non-adherents from the alienation that occurs
when the government is seen as endorsing a particular religious practice or
belief." 4 Accordingly, in applying this test to invalidate the prayer at
issue, the Santa Fe Court stated, "School sponsorship of a religious
message is impermissible because it sends the ancillary message to
members of the audience who are nonadherants 'that they are outsiders, not
full members of the political community, and an accompanying message to
106

Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1825 (2014). Although the Court
applied the coercion test in Galloway, it did not, however, find coercion to be present in that
case. Id. at 1828.
107 E.g., McCreary County v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 881 (2005); Santa Fe Indep.
Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 317 (2000).
108 Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 317.
' Id. at 298.
0
i
Id. at 297-98. The decision to have prayers at football games was reached through a
series of secret ballot votes in a procedure set up by the school district. First, students voted
on whether to have an invocation before each home football game, and then a second vote
was held to determine which student would give the invocation (this student was elected for
the entire season). It was apparently expected by all concerned that the students would vote
to have prayers before games. Id.
"I Id. at 302.
112 Id. at 309-10. See also Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 621 (1989).
113 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
114 Id
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adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political
community.'"

15

The Santa Fe Court did not rest on alienation alone. It also found that
there was no secular purpose.' 16 Further, as in Weisman, it held that the
student-led prayer was coercive, although, consistent with the decision in
Engel, it did not appear to rule that coercion was necessary for there to be
an Establishment Clause violation."' Finally, the Court also appeared to at
least give a nod to anti-divisiveness, stating that the election process from
which the student-led prayer devolved was a "mechanism [that]
encourages divisiveness along religious lines in a public school setting, a
result at odds with the Establishment Clause." 18
As the previous discussion shows, the Court has not presented a
unified theory as to what exactly is problematic about school prayer.
Rather, it has offered competing explanations. Of course, because the
cases are consistent in result, an after-the-fact reconciliation could be
possible. One could go back and recast Engel and Schempp, for example,
as actually being about preventing coercion (in the broad Lee v. Weisman
sense of the term) or about protecting individuals against feelings of
alienation-although that is not what they held."' Alternatively, one could
simply claim that all five cases are consistent applications of the first prong
of Lemon-the lack of a secular purpose. But mechanically reconciling the
cases does not answer the basic question-just what exactly is the matter
with school prayer? Part U will attempt to answer that question.

II.

JUST WHAT EXACTLY IS THE MATTER WITH SCHOOL PRAYER?

Whenever I teach the
the words of the Regents'
experience. To date, no
Pollack once described

religion clauses, I start by having the class recite
Prayer. I then ask if any of them had a religious
one has. I do not find this surprising. Louis
the Regents' Prayer as little more than "a

Santa Fe, 530 U.S. at 309-10 (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring)).
11
6 Id. at 3 17.
117 Id. at 312 ("[T]he delivery of a pregame prayer has the improper effect of coercing
115

those present to participate in an act of religious worship.").
1

' 8 Id. at 311.

119 Compare Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 436 (1963) and Abington Sch. Dist. v.
Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) with Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592 (1992).
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pathetically vacuous assertion of piety," and it is difficult to imagine how

even its daily recital could have much effect.' 20
To be sure, this exercise does not end the class discussion. Some
students contend that state-sponsored recitation of the prayer is
problematic because it involves a rote exercise, does not promote critical
thinking, and is not a part of the teaching mission. On closer examination,
however, they quickly concede that much of what occurs in the public
schools involves rote exercises, does not promote critical thinking, and is
not a part of the teaching mission.'2 1 Others suggest that the prayer is
objectionable because religion is based on faith and is therefore on
different epistemological grounds than teaching based on reason. This
argument, too, is quickly abandoned. As others in the class point out,
distinguishing between the epistemology of reason and the epistemology of
faith is difficult because reason may be subject to the same sort of
epistemological attack as faith.122
After all, assertions as to the
epistemological superiority of reason, like faith, are also ultimately
unverifiable.' 2 3
120

Louis H. Pollack, Foreword: Public Prayers in Public Schools, 77 HARV. L. REV.

62, 63 (1963).
121 One of my students did question whether it would be constitutional for the school to
lead a morning recital of something like the following:
Adam Smith, we acknowledge our dependence upon the invisible hand,
and we beg its beneficence upon us, our teachers and our Country.
My sense was that while Justice Jackson might find this unconstitutional, see W Va.
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943) ("If there is any fixed star in our
constitutional constellation, it is that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be
orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to
confess by word or act their faith therein."), Steven Smith would not, see Steven D. Smith,
Barnette's Big Blunder, 78 CHICAGO-KENT L. REV. 625, 628 (2003) (arguing that Justice
Jackson's statement in Barnette was incorrect).
122 See Frederick M. Gedicks, The Religious, the Secular, and the Antithetical, 20 CAP.
U. L. REv. 113, 139 (1991); David R. Williams, Jr., In Defense of the Secular Purpose
Status Quo, 102 VA. L. REV. 2075, 2087 (2016) (noting the argument that religious beliefs
are on the same epistemological grounds as other beliefs); Micah Schwartzman, What If
Religion Is Not Special?, 79 U. CH. L. REv. 1351, 1364 (2012) (same).
123 See Frederick M. Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, CHOOSING THE DREAM: THE FUTURE OF
IN AMERICAN PUBLIC LIFE 123 (1991) ("In postmodern thought, the
Enlightenment project is a failure, having only succeeded in replacing worship of God with
(continued)
RELIGION
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Finally, still other students suggest that the Regents' Prayer might be
problematic because it could be perceived as offensive to some. Yet even
these students are reluctant to suggest that such offense amounts to a
cognizable constitutional injury.
As they point out, much of what
government does is offensive to many; but that alone has never been
grounds for constitutional invalidation of government action. Moreover, as
they further note, other First Amendment readings strongly hold that
preventing offense to sensibilities is generally not a matter of constitutional
concern.1 24

My faux-empirical work in this area is also buttressed by my own
experience. I experienced public-school prayer as a member of a religious
minority when I was growing up, and I can report back that I and, as far as
I know, all of my classmates, survived the ordeal.1 25 No one converted,
and if any of us felt like outsiders (which some may have) in our
predominately Catholic town, it was more likely because of the way the
community celebrated Christmas and Easter than it was the reading of a
prayer at the beginning of a school day. Paul Horwitz is right when he
notes that in religiously homogenous communities it matters little whether
one's sense of being a minority comes from public or private action.' 26
Maybe it is because of this experience, or maybe it is because of the
free-speech cases rejecting offense to sensibilities as a justification for
curbing expression,1 27 but I have some trouble accepting either Justice
O'Connor's alienation rationale or Justice Kennedy's social pressure
coercion theory as justifying the school prayer prohibition.1 28 I do not

worship of science."); David Hume, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 37
(Prometheus Books 1988) (1748) (scientific knowledge is based on the belief that what
happened in the past determines what will happen in the future).
124
See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1989) (holding that preventing
offense does not support restricting speech).
125 Some of us, in fact, used the opportunity to become outstanding rubber band
sharpshooters.
126 For a particularly moving account of how painful some of these injuries were in the

Santa Fe case, see Paul Horwitz, Of Football, "Footnote One," and the CounterJurisdictionalEstablishmentClause: The Story of Santa Fe Independent School District v.
Doe, in FIRST AMENDMENT STORIES, supra note 20, at 481, 510.
127 See sources cited infra note 147.
128 William P. Marshall, The Concept of Offensiveness in Establishment and Free
Exercise Jurisprudence, 66 IND. L.J. 351, 357 (1991).
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doubt some may feel some level of alienation or coercion. 2 9 Nevertheless,
I question whether such injuries should be considered constitutionally
significant. 13 0
There are, of course, more significant reasons to be skeptical of the
anti-alienation and anti-coercion rationales beyond my own idiosyncratic
experiences. Both the alienation and coercion injuries, for example, are
highly amorphous and elastic concepts. As Andy Koppelman argued with
respect to the alienation rationale, "In a pluralistic culture, alienation is
inevitable.", 3 1 Similarly, anti-coercion, as interpreted by the Court in
Weisman, does not fare better as a limiting concept. In a pluralistic culture,
social pressure fostered by government action is unavoidable.' 32
Either rationale, moreover, if taken seriously, could lead to rather
dramatic results outside the school prayer context-including, for example,
placing in doubt the constitutionality of much of the public-school
curriculum. Fundamentalist children, after all, may be alienated or made to
feel like outsiders when the public schools teach them, against their deeply
held beliefs, that morality may be derived from sources other than a literal
reading of the Bible.' 33 Does that mean that a school's use of the Holt

129 Nor do I doubt that some school districts could turn even as vacuous as a prayer as
that at issue in Engel into a true religious exercise.
130 Contra Horwitz, supra note 126.
1 Koppelman, supra note 43, at 1840. See also Mark Tushnet, The Constitution of
Religion, 18 CONN. L. REV. 701, 712 (1986) ("[I]t is not clear why symbolic exclusion
should matter so long as 'nonadherents' are in fact actually included in the political
community. Under those circumstances, nonadherents who believe that they are excluded
from the political community are merely expressing the disappointment felt by everyone
who has lost a fair fight in the arena of politics."); Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions,
and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86
MICH. L. REv. 266, 307 (1987) (arguing that because not all beliefs can prevail in the
political process, those whose positions are not accepted will necessarily feel like
outsiders).
132 See Mark Strasser, The Coercion Test: On Prayer, Offense, and Doctrinal
Inculcation, SAINT Louis U. L.J. 417, 422-23 (2009) ("[I]n many cases involving alleged
violations of Establishment Clause guarantees, the requirement that there be proof of
indirect coercion may not pose much of a bar.").
133 See Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, "He Drew a Circle that Shut Me Out": Assimilation,
Indoctrination, and the Paradox of a Liberal Education, 106 HARv. L. REv 581, 609
(1993).
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Rinehart readers is unconstitutional? 134 Similarly, the teaching (and the
testing) of the theory of evolution may have coercive effects on those who
do not accept evolution's tenets on religious grounds. Does that mean that
the teaching of evolution in the public schools is impermissible?"'
Whether the alienation and coercion justifications should remain a part
of Establishment Clause jurisprudence is beyond the scope of this Article.
But the weaknesses in those approaches and, in particular, their
implications for public-school teaching overall, suggest that the later
school prayer cases may have taken a wrong turn when they began
focusing on the effect of the prayers on nonadherents. It is therefore
necessary to return to Engel and reexamine whether the anti-divisiveness
justification offered in that decision may be more helpful.136
A. Engel and Anti-Divisiveness
Engel, as we have seen, was concerned with the divisiveness that arises
when religions compete for the government's stamp of approval."' At
least as a descriptive matter, there seems little doubt that Engel was exactly

134 Mozert v. Hawkins Cty. Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058, 1070 (6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting
the claim of fundamentalist plaintiffs who contended that reading of certain secular texts in
the public schools violated their free-exercise rights).
135 I expect that some might object to comparing school prayer with the teaching of
morality and science on grounds that prayer is religious while the teaching of morality and
science are secular activities and therefore not subject to Establishment Clause restrictions.
But that, of course, depends upon whose perspective one adopts to answer the question of
what is religious. To some believers, the teaching of morality and evolution are activities
with deep theological content and are as religiously-laden as the purest form of prayer. See
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 107 (1968). To such believers, the public schools are
teaching religion.
Some might then respond that just because some may view the activities of the public
schools as "religious" does not make those activities religious. Maybe. But the antiestablishment mandate should suggest that it is at least problematic for constitutional law to
create a privileged standpoint from which to make universal observations about what is
religious and what is not.
136 There may also be an anti-corruption argument at issue. Even if the exercise is not
state-authored, there is an argument to be made that having secular teachers lead prayer or
Bible-reading recitals in public-school classrooms fosters disrespect for religion. Engel v.
Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431-32 (1962); Koppelman, supra note 43, at 1846.
1 37
Engel, 370 U.S. at 429.
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right in suggesting school prayer is religiously divisive."' After all, the
question of whether there should be school prayer is inextricably bound up
with the secondary question of if so, whose prayer? The "whose prayer"
question, in turn, cannot be answered without the government choosing
among, and thereby favoring, selected religious beliefs.
And that is exactly where the dangers of religious divisiveness become
the most manifest. The issue of whose religion the state will favor is one
that has provoked, and continues to provoke, endless discord throughout
the world.139 It has fostered endless controversy in the United Statesfrom debates over which religion's version of the Ten Commandments
should be recognized by the State 4 0 to the creation of parochial schools as
a reaction to the recital of Protestant prayer in the public schools. 141
Indeed, one need look no further than the contemporary American
experience surrounding legislative prayer for proof of the merits of the
divisiveness claim.142 As Christopher Lund has demonstrated, divisiveness
arising over the question of "whose prayer" has proven to be an actuality
rather than an unfounded fear.1 43 Controversies over whose prayer should
be recited at legislative sessions have led not only to sectarian divisions but
also to occasional violence.'" Debates over school prayer would likely be
even more contentious given that the upbringing of children is at stake.
The question is not whether school prayer leads to divisiveness; it
assuredly does. The question is whether that divisiveness is a matter of
constitutional concern. Some leading commentators argue that it is not.
Andrew Koppelman argues, for example, that "political division is an
131 See Christopher C. Lund, Legislative Prayer and the Secret Costs of Religious

Endorsements, 94 MINN. L. REv. 972, 981-82 (2010).
139 See Engel, 370 U.S. at 429.

140 Persons have been killed over the question

of whose version of the Ten

Commandments (Protestant or Catholic) should be the one displayed by the government.
RAY ALLEN BILLINGTON, THE PROTESTANT CRUSADE 1800-1860: A STUDY OF THE ORIGINS

OF AMERICAN NATIvISM 222 (Rinehart & Co. ed., 1952) (1938) (noting that in 1844, riots

erupted in Philadelphia between Catholics and Protestants over whose version of the Bible
should be used in the public-school setting).
141 Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 628 (Douglas, J., concurring) (noting that
Catholic schools came into existence because of Protestant prayer in the public schools).

Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793 (1983) (holding that legislative prayer was
permissible); Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828 (2014).
142

143 See Lund, supra note 138, at 993.
144 Id. at 974-75.
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unavoidable part of life in a democracy."'4 5 Richard Garnett goes further.
In his comprehensive treatment of the divisiveness argument in religion
clause jurisprudence, he shows how the argument that divisiveness is
unconstitutional is inconsistent with the idea of a robust democracy. 146 1
agree with the accounts of both authors and would further emphasize that
the call to end political divisiveness is flatly inconsistent with much of
First Amendment speech jurisprudence that celebrates division and robust
debate.1 4 7
That said, I do not think this observation ends the inquiry. The
divisiveness-as-part-of-democratic-politics point may be well taken with
respect to the political give and take that arises when religious
organizations enter the political fray on issues involving funding or the
adoption or rejection of substantive policies, even when those policies have
theological overtones such as abortion or gay rights. But in those cases,
the organization that wins or loses the legislative debate has not put itself
up for political approval or disapproval and, more importantly, has not put
itself up against other religions for political approval or disapproval. The
same cannot be said with respect to the question of "whose prayer?" When
that question is put to the political process, the perceived existential
validity of the religion itself may be seen as up for legitimization. For this
reason, I would suggest that when the political process places at stake the
government's stamp of approval of religion, the divisiveness that results is
of a completely different breed than is the divisiveness created by other
political disputes.
There are strong explanations for this. As I have written elsewhere,
the reason why conflicts among religions are so combustible stems from
Koppelman, supra note 43, at 1838.

Koppelman may actually come closer to
accepting the anti-divisiveness rationale than he lets on. In his article on secular purpose,
Koppelman argues that one of the reasons the government should be prohibited from
declaring religious truth is because to do so would disrupt civil peace. Koppelman, supra
note 59, at 110.
146 Garnett,supra note 38, at 1711.
147 See Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 26 (1971); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376
U.S. 254, 269-70 (1964). Richard Garnett also makes this point quoting at length from
Justice Brennan's opinion in Texas v. Johnson: "As Justice Brennan observed-a 'function
of free speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve
its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest, creates dissatisfaction with
conditions as they are, or even stirs people to anger."' Garnett, supra note 38, at 1671
(quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 408-09 (1989)).
145
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the inherent nature of religious belief.i1s Because for some, religious belief
serves as a defense to existential fear and anxiety (what the theologian
Rudolph Otto referred to as the tremendum), the believer may form a
particularly strong attachment to those beliefs and the subsequent need to
validate her belief system to the exclusion of others.14 9 For these believers,
the attachment to religion is one that can lead them to deny the legitimacy
of other religious beliefs because the existence of those other beliefs is
perceived as a challenge to their own."so For such believers, attacking the
beliefs of others is a natural reaction to a perceived assault on their own
beliefs."' Accordingly, believers, to the extent they can, will want to use
whatever process they have available (including the political process) to
validate and confirm the legitimacy of their own beliefs over the beliefs of
others. In short, to use the language of Engel, believers may feel
compelled to do all they can to gain the government's "stamp of
approval."' 5 2
At the same time, adherents of other religions will likely see the
attacks of the believer as just that: attacks. Accordingly, they will likely
respond by leveraging their own political power to assert the dominance of
their belief system. The result is a political battle among religions with the
highest stakes possible."' Moreover, since this is a battle for dominance, it
is something that cannot be settled and cannot be compromised. The

148
149

William P. Marshall, The Other Side ofReligion, 44 HASTINGS L.J. 843, 858 (1993).
Rudolf Otto called the fear produced by a religious encounter "mysterium

tremendum." RUDOLF OTTO, THE IDEA OF THE HOLY: AN INQUIRY INTO THE NON-RATIONAL
FACTOR IN THE IDEA OF THE DIVINE AND ITS RELATION TO THE RATIONAL 12-13 (John W.

Harvey trans., 2d ed. 1950). See also ERwIN RAMSDELL GOODENOUGH, THE PSYCHOLOGY
OF RELIGIOUS EXPERIENCES 7 (1965) (suggesting that the paradox of religion is that it allows

the believer to avoid the tremendum by ostensibly confronting it).
I

50

See MIRCEA ELIADE, THE SACRED AND THE PROFANE: THE NATURE OF RELIGION 47-

48 (Willard R. Trask trans., 1959).
1I See id. ("Since '[the Believer's] world' is a cosmos, any attack from without
threatens to turn it into chaos.").
I Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962). Justice Holmes comes at this point
another way. As Holmes wrote in his dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting), the logical result of deep conviction is often intolerance: "If
you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a certain result with all your
heart you naturally express your wishes in law and sweep away all opposition."
i" Smith, supra note 55, at 1017-18.
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possibility of "anguish, hardship and bitter strife"l 54 along religious lines,
therefore, is likely and manifest."' Engel, I would submit, was therefore
on point in seeing the value of anti-divisiveness as a central Establishment
Clause concern.
B. Difficulties Within the Anti-Divisiveness Approach
Reinvigorating Engel's concern with religious divisiveness as an
animating Establishment Clause principle is not without its weaknesses. It
does not tell us outside the realm of school prayer, for example, when a
government action should be deemed as conferring "the stamp of
approval" on religion. It does not answer, to use Michael McConnell's
dichotomy, whether a state action such as exhibiting a religiously-laden
symbol should be perceived as a mirror of the public culture or an example
of the sort of religious triumphalism against which Engel spoke.15 6 It
therefore raises many of the same concerns of subjective application
inherent in Justice O'Connor's non-endorsement test.157 Furthermore, any
distinction between matters such as school prayer that place at stake the
validity of the religion itself and government actions that merely reflect a
religious organization's theological positions will likely be difficult to
apply. The approach in Engel, in short, is not likely to be a recipe for a
new era of clarity in Establishment Clause jurisprudence.
More fundamentally, the question of whether religious divisiveness
should be a matter of constitutional concern is certainly still debatable even
if limited along the lines suggested above. Is there any reason, as some
have argued, to believe that divisiveness along religious lines is any more
problematic than divisions along racial, gender, or ethnic lines? 58
Certainly, there is truth to the notion that any form of identity politics can

154 Engel,

370 U.S. at 429.
1I In contrast, removing the prize of the government's imprimatur from the political
process minimizes this danger because the avenue of politics as a process to legitimize
one's religious faith is not an option. Prevailing in the political arena, then, is no longer a
test of one's religious beliefs. Marshall, supra note 148, at 861-62.
16 Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. REv. 115,
193 (1992). See also Koppelman, supra note 59, at 151.
"s'See Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment
Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REv. 266, 276 (1987) (discussing
the inherent subjectivity of the non-endorsement test).
.ss Koppelman, supra note 43, at 1838.
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be particularly divisive."' In fact, as Reva Siegel has shown, an antidivisiveness component has recently seemed to enter equal-protection
analysis in the cases addressing affirmative action for precisely this
reason.16 0

Nevertheless, there are reasons to believe that religious divisiveness is,
and should be, of particular constitutional significance. One has already
been discussed. Because religious belief addresses matters of existential
concern and anxiety, political battles over whose religion should receive
government approval are likely to be particularly acrimonious and
volatile.' 61

Second, as a historical matter, there is little doubt that the acrimony
and volatility created by sectarian divisions were on the Framers' minds
when they enacted the Establishment Clause.1 62 They were well aware of
the violence and persecution that results when religions compete for the
government imprimatur.1 63
Third, religion is distinguishable from other types of identity politics
because religion has an ideological, as well as an identity component.1 64
Preferring a certain religion, then, does not only prefer a class based on its
identity; it also prefers a certain set of views. Sectarian disputes thus
combine the vitriol of ideological clashes along with the acrimony of
identity politics in a manner that potentially transcends the divisiveness
caused by either ideological or identity conflict taken alone.1 65

159

See id. at 1838-39.

1s Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindnessto Antibalkanization: An Emerging Ground of
Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1356-57 (2011) ("Justice Kennedy
is clear that government may act in race-conscious ways to promote equal opportunity for
all, so long as government pursues these ends in ways that do not make race so salient as to
affront dignity and threaten divisiveness.").
161 See supra notes 148-155 and accompanying text.
162 Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).
163 Id.
16 William P. Marshall, Religion as Ideas: Religion as Identity, 7 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL
ISSUES 385, 395 (1996).
165 Id.
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III. THE IRONIES IN RELYING ON ANTI-DIVISIVENESS AS GROUNDS
FOR INVALIDATING SCHOOL PRAYER

A. The Divisiveness ofEngel and Schempp
There is, of course, as Steven Smith suggests, a major irony in
defending the non-divisiveness rationale in the contexts of Engel and
Schempp.'66 If one of the central purposes of the Religion Clauses is
lessening divisiveness, then the School Prayer decisions, one could argue
at least in hindsight, 167 were exactly the wrong methods to go about it.
It is a fair point. After all, this Article began with the observation that
Engel and Schempp stand as two of the most controversial cases in
Supreme Court history and that the social and cultural tremors caused by
the decisions still intensely reverberate.16 8 It is therefore difficult to
maintain that the School Prayer decisions themselves should not be subject
to their own divisiveness critique.
Further, Steven Smith's observation that the societal effects of Engel
and Schempp have extended far beyond school prayer alone and have
served to disfavor a major part of the American polity-thus increasing
social divisions more broadly-must also be considered.169 If, as Smith
argues, Engel and Schempp ushered in an era of secularist primacy,170 then
there would seem to be little doubt that they have also had the effect of
provoking serious cultural resistance. Accordingly, given this role that the
School Prayer decisions have played in fomenting the culture wars, it
might seem a stretch to now defend the decisions as vehicles that foster
social cohesion.
Nevertheless, there is a difference between a general culture war and
sectarian strife. While the former certainly can be divisive, it is not the
same as pitting specific religions against one another in ongoing contests
for government approval. The religious wars of Europe were between
sects, not between amorphous groups having amorphous views about the
role of religion in society. 17 1 Moreover, the harm to the providentialist

166 Smith, supra note 55, at 1017-20.

167

But see Lain, supra note 12, at 484, 499-506 (arguing that the Court did not expect
the decision to be so divisive).
168 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text.
169 Smith, supra note 55, at 1019.
170 Id
171 Id at 1017-18.
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vision that Smith identifies172 seems far closer to the injury of individual
alienation than it does to the social harms caused by sectarian division,
again suggesting that the comparison between culture wars and sectarian
strife are at least somewhat inapposite.
This does not mean that the matters identified by Professor Smith are
not significant. They surely are. Moreover, although I would argue that
constitutional law has actually not imposed the type of secularist orthodoxy
that Smith describes,1 3 I do agree with his central assertions that
secularism is not neutral and that a too rigid application of secularist
principles creates its own constitutional concerns.1 7 4 Those concerns are
not so great, however, as to outweigh the concerns with sectarian divisions
that inevitably attend state-sponsored school prayer. After all, as Smith
himself notes, "[P]ublic schools have an especially central and even mythic
That religious sects would be
place in American democracy. "'
particularly driven to battle with other sects over the content and nature of
religious liturgies performed in the public schools should therefore be
expected. History bears this out. After the wave of Catholic immigration
in the nineteenth century, the question of whose prayer should be used in
the public schools bitterly divided Protestants and Catholics for decades.17 6
There is every reason to believe that a similar dynamic would have
occurred in the latter part of the twentieth and the first part of the twentyfirst centuries had Engel and Schempp not been decided as they were.
Without the School Prayer decisions, new waves of immigrants with
divergent religious traditions would have wanted their own prayers in their
public schools or, alternatively, would have wanted the cessation of
prayers from outside their own religious traditions. Political conflict along
religious lines would therefore have been inevitable, and that conflict
Id. at 1019-20.
See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 795 (1983) (upholding legislative prayer);
Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S. Ct. 1811, 1828 (2014) (same). The Court has also
consistently rejected separationist claims in a line of free-speech and parochial-aid cases
extending from Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 276-77 (1981) (holding that prayer
groups were entitled to have the same access to public facilities as other groups), to Zelman
v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 662-63 (2002) (upholding school vouchers). The record
does not suggest that an orthodoxy of political secularism has actually been established.
174 See William P. Marshall, The Limits of Secularism: Public Religious Expression in
Moments ofNational Crisis and Tragedy, 78 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 11, 16-17 (2002).
175 Smith, supra note 55, at 993. See also supra note 14 and authorities cited therein.
176 See GREEN, supra note 20, at 96-97.
172
173
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would likely have been particularly severe as demographics changed and
new religious coalitions emerged to challenge the existing religious
establishment. In short, no matter how divisive the School Prayer
decisions may have been, they were likely far less divisive than the
sectarian battles that would have occurred without them.
B. The Anti-Divisiveness Rationaleand the Regents' Prayer
There is yet one other possible irony in looking to Engel as the genesis
of the anti-divisiveness rationale. Does the anti-divisiveness rationale
support striking down the prayer in Engel itself? While the Bible readings
and the Lord's Prayer at issue in Schempp were clearly part of a specific
religious tradition, thereby directly implicating concerns about sects
competing for government imprimatur,' 77 the same cannot be said of the
prayer at issue in Engel. The Regents' Prayer was not taken from any
specific religion's liturgy and was, in actuality, an attempt at
ecumenicalism rather than a reflection of sectarian triumphalism.1 78 It is
therefore not easily condemned as the product of "zealous religious groups.
struggl[ing] with one another to obtain the Government's stamp of
approval."179 For that reason, then, it could be argued that the actual result
in Engel might be more soundly based on the case's alternative rationalethe anti-corruption of religion-than on the anti-divisiveness rationale
offered here.'" Perhaps. Certainly, the argument that "respecting an
establishment of religion must at least mean that in this country it is no part
of the business of government to compose official prayers for any group of
the American people to recite as a part of a religious program carried on by
government""s' could be, in and of itself, a sufficient justification to
invalidate the Regents' Prayer.
Nevertheless, the constitutional concern with religious divisiveness
also justifies invalidating an ecumenical effort like the Regents' Prayer.
To begin with, ecumenicalism is not ecumenical. To some believers,
religious ecumenicalism is completely contrary to their deeply-held
religious principles. As Timothy Hall has noted, ecumenicalism is "a
religious vision with respectable credentials.
It is, nevertheless, a
particular religious vision [that is] the implacable foe of religious
"'See Abington Twp. Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 210-11, 282-83 (1963).
178 Berg, supra note 20, at 196, 199.
7
8

1

' Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 429 (1962).
See supra note 63 and accompanying text.
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Engel, 370 U.S. at 425.
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The choice by government to select an ecumenical

prayer, therefore, is religiously divisive.'
Further, the potential for sectarian divisiveness is also inherent in the
decisional process of how any ecumenical prayer should be composed. In
the case of the Regents' Prayer, the state of New York apparently
assembled, to write the prayer, "a team of ministers, priests, and rabbis"
selected to reflect the religious composition of the state. 184 Yet, how can
specific sects or specific religious leaders be recognized by the government
as appropriate to sit at the drafting table without the government bestowing
its legitimacy on those chosen and without thereby exciting religious
jealousies and religious tensions among those seeking recognition?
Accordingly, although the anti-corruption rationale may provide one basis
for the decision in Engel, it is equally apparent that the anti-divisiveness
justification provides another.
IV. CONCLUSION
In Engel v. Vitale, the United States Supreme Court relied on the
interest in limiting religious divisiveness for its rationale in striking down
18
public-school prayer.s
Later Court decisions addressing prayer, however,
have veered from Engel's original understanding. Rather, these later cases
have tended to focus on harms to individuals, such as coercion or
alienation, that purportedly result from public religious exercise, as their
grounds for decision. 186 Engel, however, may have had it right. The harms
of alienation and coercion may simply be too amorphous and elastic in this
context to base First Amendment doctrine on them. The concern with
religious divisiveness, on the other hand, is more soundly based.
To begin with, it reflects the historical record. The European religious
wars, of which the Framers were acutely aware, provide graphic examples,
for both then and now, of the harms that result when religions compete
182 Timothy L. Hall,

Sacred Solemnity: Civic Prayer, Civil Communion, and the

Establishment Clause, 79 IOwA L. REv. 35, 88 (1993).
18 Ken Klukowski, 9/11 Services Show Liberal Politicizing of Memorials,
WASH.
EXAMINER (Sept. 8, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.washingtonexaminer.com/91 1-servicesshow-liberal-politicizing-of-memorials/article/40900
[https://perma.cc/Q8VA-K36V]
(expressing dissatisfaction that the religious leaders invited to a ten-year 9/11 memorial
service at the National Cathedral only represented 6% of the U.S. population).
184 Berg, supra note 20, at 196.
185 370 U.S. at 429.
186 See supra Section I.B.
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with each other for the government's "stamp of approval."' Even more
fundamentally, the divisiveness concern also reflects the inherent dangers
that exist in the dynamic of religious belief. Placing the prize of a
religion's primacy as something that can be won through the political
process is an invitation for believers to test the strength of their religious
belief through political activity, and, as such, it inevitably leads to the most
troubling forms of sectarian strife. The Engel Court was correct in
asserting that government actions that could reflect a religion's dominance
are matters that are best taken off the political table. The constitutional
concern with school prayer, in short, is less about "prayer" than it is about
"whose prayer?"
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Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 718 (2002) (Breyer, J., dissenting).

